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Agenda Setting, Influence, and Voting Rules: The Influence of the European 
Commission and Status Quo Bias in the Common Agricultural Policy of the EU 
 
 
1.   Introduction 
Agricultural policy remains one of the most important policy areas of the European Union (EU). 
Close to half of the EU budget is still spent on agriculture, which is extensively regulated in the 
framework of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The CAP has been the subject of wide 
criticism both in terms of the budget resources it uses, and in terms of the distortions, it induces 
both internally in the EU and externally on world markets.  
The persistence of the inefficient policy instruments under the CAP has induced a wide 
literature on the political economy of the CAP, and on how the decision-making process affects 
the policy outcomes in this field. However, the majority of studies in the agricultural economics 
literature on decision-making on the CAP is either of an empirical, relating indicators of policy 
distortions with a set of political indicator variables, or a descriptive nature, analyzing the 
historical development of the CAP, its context as well as motives behind certain decisions 
(Tracy, 1984, 1996, Neville-Rolfe, 1984, Harvey, 1982, Fearne 1991, Josling and Moyer 1991, 
Moyer and Josling, 1990,  Ackrill 2000, Pearce 1983, Wallace 1983 and others).  
However, there is hardly any formal analysis of the decision-making process on the 
CAP. The main reason is that the decision-making process is an institutionally complex 
procedure, in which the Member State governments, the European Commission, and the Council 
of Agricultural Ministers all play an important role. While the Council of Ministers ultimately 
takes the decisions, the Commission has the sole right of proposal. The Council of Ministers 
cannot formally consider any proposal that has not come from the Commission. If the qualified 
majority in the Council does not approve the proposal, the Commission (in cooperation with the 
Council) drafts a new proposal until a final compromise is reached. This seems to put the 
Commission in a privileged and influential position in the decision-making process. However, 
the literature has different views on how the Commission uses these agenda-setting powers. For 
example, Coleman and Tangermann (1999) view the Commission as an independent body which 
plays a role as entrepreneurial leader, and which pursues its own preferences. On the other hand, 
Moravcsik (1994) argues that the Commission just decreases transaction costs of inter-country   3 
bargaining. Modeling this multi-stage and multi-agent decision-making process is complicated 
and, therefore, relatively little formal analysis is devoted to the CAP in the political economy 
literature. 
In the general public choice literature, there is a significant literature on decision-making 
in the EU based on Shapley and Banzhaf indices (Winkler (1998), Widgren (1994), Hosli 
(1996), Bindseil and Hantke (1997) and others). Shapley and Banzhaf indices measure the 
probability that the Member State casts a decisive vote, i.e. Member State's potential to change 
the result of voting. However, these studies typically assume that any coalition of Member States 
supporting a motion is possible and equally probable. That is, preferences of Member States 
play no role in this voting game (Straffin, 1988). For this reason, this approach is not 
appropriate to analyze CAP decision-making where preferences of Member States are crucial. 
In this paper we develop a formal model of the decision-making on the CAP that 
explicitly includes the two stages of, first, determining Member States preferences and, 
afterwards, of the joint decision-making of the EU Member State governments in the Council of 
Ministers. We analyze the "influence" of the agents involved, and the likelihood of a political 
stalemate, resulting in a status quo bias. Furthermore, we show how these results change under 
different institutional assumptions such as voting procedures (majority rules), and how they are 
affected by changes in the external environment. 
We derive several results. The influence of the European Commission on the final policy 
decision depends on the voting rule. The occurrence of political stalemate is also a function of 
voting rule adopted in the Council of Ministers. We also show that the probability of a stalemate 
also depends on changes in external environments, which have taken place since the previous 
decision-making round.  
  The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 evaluates national preferences on the CAP. 
A two-stage model of CAP decision-making process is presented in section 3. The two-stage 
model of CAP is used in section 4 to analyze Commission influence and status quo bias under 
various voting rules. The final section summarizes the results and draws some conclusions.  
 
 2.  Member States Preferences on the CAP 
The CAP was first implemented at the end of the 1960s. The main aspect of the CAP was an 
intervention price for important commodities, including grains, sugar, beef, and milk, combined 
with the trade instruments (variable import levies and export refunds) needed to sustain this 
intervention price. The policy specifics differ between commodities and have changed over time.   4 
Due to several reforms of the CAP since then, the CAP has become more complex. However to 
keep the analysis tractable we assume in our model that there is one agricultural commodity and 
that the national governments and the Council of Ministers only have to decide on one policy 
variable: the intervention price for this agricultural commodity
1. 
Assume further that there are two sectors in country j: agriculture (Aj) and the rest of the 
economy (Bj). Assume that all individuals in the economy have identical preferences and 
maximize an indirect utility function U(yj
i), where yj
i  represents individual income and i = A,B.  
Each sector has nj
i identical individuals with pre-policy income ej
i. 
Let P
0 denote the market price of the agricultural commodity and Pj the intervention 
price in country j. Then per unit subsidy is sj = Pj – P
0. Rj
A is the total transfer of income to 
sector Aj. Rj
A depends on the intervention price and on agricultural production (Qj
A): Rj




A.   
For simplicity, we ignore deadweight costs. This may seem a rather strong assumption, 
given the impact of the CAP on distortions, which are therefore at the core of the debate on the 
CAP. However, in the context of this analysis it merely simplifies the notation, and does not 
significantly alter my conclusions.  
The transfer of income is financed from a tax (Rj






B. As deadweight costs are assumed away, a balanced budget implies that Rj
B
 = -Rj
A .  
















B          (2) 
 
  The politically optimal per unit subsidy is denoted as sj* = Pj* - P
0 and Pj* is the 
politically optimal intervention price in country j. By definition, the politically optimal 
intervention price implies that either increasing or decreasing the intervention price from the level 
Pj* reduces political support for the government of country j. In other words, countries have 
Euclidean single-peaked preferences over the domain of the policy variable, i.e. the intervention 
price
3. 
                                                         
1 Alternatively one could assume that the decision variable is the level of direct payments - this would not affect 
the result of the paper. 
2  The tax on sector B can be implemented through an income tax or through higher consumer prices. Given 
our no deadweight cost assumptions, both are possible interpretations of our model.  
3 Formally this characteristic of Pj* can be derived from several underlying models on decision-making   5 
Assume now that country j is part of the EU (i.e. member state j) and that the 
agricultural intervention price is part of the CAP. This will alter the Member States' preferences 
on the CAP because of two important characteristics of the CAP: common prices and financial 
solidarity. The principle of common prices implies that the intervention price is the same in all 
Member States
4. Financial solidarity implies that the balanced budget equation does not have to 




A = Σ Rj
A and R
B = Σ Rj
B for j =1...k.  Member states for which Rj
A 
> Rj
B are net beneficiaries of the CAP while member states for which Rj
A < Rj
B are net 
contributors to the CAP.   
Let Pj
# denote the politically optimal intervention price and sj
# the politically optimal per 
unit subsidy for a country inside the CAP. The politically optimal intervention price for a 
country outside the CAP (Pj*) would be lower for a country which is a net beneficiary of the 
CAP and vice versa for a net contributor to the CAP than its politically preferred price inside the 
CAP (Pj
#).  Specifically: 
 
If, ∀  Pj: 
Rj
A(Pj) > Rj
B(Pj) ⇒  Pj* < Pj
#       (5) 
Rj
A(Pj) < Rj
B(Pj) ⇒  Pj* > Pj
#       (6) 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
in the countries. For example, one model which yields this result is the model of Swinnen (1994) and Swinnen 
and de Gorter (1993, 1998). In their model, individual political support S
i is assumed to be a strictly concave 
and an increasing function of the change in utility caused by the policy: Sj
i = Sj[v
i (Pj)], where vj
i (Pj) = Uj
i (Pj) - 
Uj
i  (0) and where all individuals are assumed to have identical support functions. The politically optimal 
domestic intervention price is then determined by the government maximizing total political support, Γ j, i.e.:  
 




B(Pj))     (3) 
   Pj 
 
Hence, country j’s politically optimal intervention price, Pj*, is determined by: 
 










A’ refer to the first order derivatives of S
i, U
i respectively. This condition implies that 
 ∂Γ j /∂ Pj < 0 for Pj > Pj* and ∂Γ j /∂ Pj > 0 for Pj < Pj*.   
 
4 We ignore exchange rate effects.   6 
 
The reasoning is straightforward. Some of the income going to agriculture of a net 
beneficiary of the CAP comes from taxes on other Member States. Hence, the government can 
give higher subsidies to agriculture for a given tax on the rest of the domestic economy. 
Therefore, ceteris paribus,  governments of net beneficiary member states will prefer higher 
intervention price than their domestic optimal intervention price would have been outside the 
CAP. However, the opposite also holds: governments of net contributing Member States will 
prefer lower intervention price than their domestic optimal intervention price would have been 
outside the CAP.   
For example, Mahé and Roe (1996) estimated inter-country transfers of income between 
member states of the EU caused by the CAP and showed that Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands, and Portugal were net contributors to the CAP in 1996. Ceteris paribus, 
these countries would therefore have higher politically optimal intervention prices on their own. 
Without financial solidarity under the CAP, transfers of income to domestic farmers would not 
require from domestic taxpayers and consumers to subsidize foreign farmers too. For a given tax 
on the rest of economy, agricultural producers would obtain more in net contributing countries 
without financial solidarity. On the other hand, Denmark, France, Ireland, United Kingdom, 
Greece, and Spain were net beneficiaries of the CAP in 1996. By analogy, their politically 
optimal prices would be lower without the financial solidarity, ceteris paribus. 
 
3.  A Model of the CAP Decision-Making Process 
The decision concerning the common intervention prices is made in the annual CAP review by 
the Council of Agricultural Ministers
5. A simple consultation procedure applies to most policy 
issues within the framework of the CAP. Under this procedure, the EU Commission makes a 
proposal and the Council decides on the proposal, after receiving a non-binding opinion from the 
European Parliament. Decision-making in the Council proceeds by vote and qualified weighted 
majority is used
6. To be accepted by “qualified majority”, a proposal must obtain 62 out of a 
                                                         
5 The CAP decision-making process is discussed in, for  example, Tracy (1996) and Fearne (1991). 
6 Currently the distribution of votes is: 
-10 votes each for Germany, France, Italy, and the UK; 
-8 votes for Spain; 
-5 votes each for Belgium, Netherlands, Greece, and Portugal; 
-4 votes each for Austria and Sweden;   7 
total of 87 votes. 
  Each Member State can propose an amendment to the Commission proposal. The 
amendment is adopted if it is accepted unanimously. In practice, the Commission considers 
political acceptability of its proposal by the Council. Furthermore, in order to achieve the final 
compromise, the Commission may be “obliged” to adjust its proposals in accordance with the 
Council’s line of thinking (Fearne, 1991).  
We model the CAP decision-making as a set of voting rounds to determine the 
equilibrium intervention price within the Council of Ministers. Define PEU
0 as the existing 
common intervention price in the EU, i.e. the intervention price decided in last year’s decision-
making round. We assume that at the beginning of the annual decision-making round, the 
Commission proposes a common intervention price for the next year, PEU
N. This price can be the 
same as last year’s or a different one. 
  The Council of Ministers votes on the proposal. We assume that the voting behavior of 
each minister is determined by the politically optimal intervention price for the government the 
minister represents. More specifically, a minister will vote in favor of the proposal if the 
proposed price PEU
N is closer to his/her government’s optimum than the current price PEU
0 (or if 
it is the same). Formally: 
 
vj = 1 iff | PEU
N – Pj
# | ≤  | PEU
0 – Pj
# |     (7) 
vj = 0 iff | PEU
N – Pj
# | > | PEU
0 – Pj
# |     (8) 
 
where vj is the voting decision by minister j (i.e. of country j). The proposal is accepted if  
 
∑ j nj
v.vj ≥  ￿        ( 9 )  
 
where nj
v LV WKH QXPEHU RI YRWHV RI FRXQWU\ M DQG￿ WKH PLQLPXP DPRXQW RI YRWHV QHHGHG WR
approve the proposal. 
  We assume that, after the vote, either the Commission or a minister of a Member State, 
can table a new proposal on which a new vote takes place. If the previous vote was approved, 
the newly approved common intervention price now becomes the price against which a new 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
-3 votes each for Denmark, Finland, and Ireland; 
-2 votes for Luxembourg.   8 
proposal is evaluated. Voting goes on until no new proposal is accepted. The intervention price 
which is chosen by the Council, the “equilibrium intervention price” PEU
M, is the last one which 
was approved. 
  It is obvious from equation (9) that the equilibrium intervention price will depend on the 
decision-PDNLQJ UXOHV ZKLFK GHWHUPLQH WKH DPRXQW RI YRWHV QHHGHG￿ ￿￿ DQG RQ WKH GLVWULEXWLRQ RI
votes, nj
V. In the next sections, we will discuss the equilibrium intervention price under three 
different decision-making rules which are used in the EU. While the qualified majority rule is 
officially used by the Council of Ministers on most agricultural policy decisions, for expositional 
purposes we start with the analysis under assumption of a simple majority rule. This is simpler 
to analyze and it helps to understand the result in the more complicated analysis of qualified 
majority decision-making, which we turn to afterwards. 
 
4.   Commission Influence and Status Quo Bias  
Assume that the Commission has some preference of its own regarding the common 
intervention price. This Commission preference may be due to personal preferences, to the 
Commission’s concern for economic efficiency or for the welfare of some interest groups, or due 
to other reasons. Here, we do not analyze the likely preferences of the Commission, nor their 
causes. We merely assume that the Commission has its own preference, which may diverge from 
that of the majority of the Member States.       
We define the (potential) “influence” of the Commission as the price domain over which 
the Commission can pick a price according to its own preference and which price will be finally 
agreed upon by the Council of Ministers. Hence, if this domain is large, the Commission has 
much potential influence because any price it picks within this domain will be the final price, and 
its own preferences can play an important role.   
As we will show below, the size of this choice domain, and hence the influence of the 
Commission will depend upon the voting rules, and upon exogenous changes. In our model, 
exogenous changes refer to changes in e.g. market conditions, which affect the preferences of the 
Member States – and presumably of the Commission. One example of such exogenous change 
could be declining world market prices due to developments in other parts of the world and 
which affect the budgetary costs and distortions caused by the CAP.   
Yet, it may also be the case that no proposal of the Commission will be accepted. In 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
   9 
other words, not a single Commission proposal for a new intervention price will be accepted by 
the Council of Ministers. We refer to this case as the “status quo”: the Council cannot reach an 
agreement to change the intervention price, and hence the existing intervention price remains 
unaltered. The likelihood that this occurs also depends on the voting rules and on exogenous 
changes.   
In the rest of this section we derive the “influence” of the Commission and the likelihood 
of a status quo outcome under various decision-making rules.   
 
Simple Majority Voting 
Assume the following order of the politically optimal intervention prices, Pj
#, of Member 
States: Country 1 has the lowest politically optimal price P1
#, country k  has the highest 
politically optimal common price Pk
#. P1
# < P2
# … < Pk
#. Country 1 has n1
v votes in the Council, 
country 2 has n2
v
 votes, and country k has nk
v votes.  
Assume further that the countries together have an uneven number of votes in the 
Council (as it is currently the case in the EU-15, 87 votes) and that PM
# is the median politically 
optimal price. This is the politically optimal price of the country that has the 44
th vote. we refer 
to the country with PM
# as the politically optimal intervention price as the “median country”. 
In a single-dimensional issue
7, that is when, as assumed above, a decision concerns only 
one policy variable and if all voting agents have single-peaked preferences defined over the 
domain of the policy variable, then the median voter cannot lose under simple majority rule. This 
result is known as the “median voter” rule (Mueller, 1989). We have shown above that in the 
case we analyze the voters in the Council of Ministers, i.e. the Ministers, have single peaked 
preferences. The median voter rule therefore implies that the politically optimal price of the 
median country will be adopted as the common price. 
It is easy to see that under simple majority voting in the Council, the Commission has no 
influence on policies. The equilibrium outcome is the politically optimal price of the median 




                                                         
 
7 In multidimensional case the necessary and sufficient condition for existence of a dominant point under 
simple majority rule requires that it be a median in all directions (Mueller, 1989).     10 
Qualified Majority Voting 
Under a qualified majority system, adoption of the Commission proposal requires more than 
50 percent of the votes;  RWKHUZLVH WKH FRPPRQ SULFH VWD\V XQFKDQJHG￿ ￿ LV GHILQHGas the votes 
required for a qualified majority. (Under the currently used system on CAP decisions, approval 
UHTXLUHV DW OHDVW ￿￿ YRWHV IURP &RXQFLO PHPEHUV￿ L￿H￿ ￿  ￿￿￿￿ 




 ￿ ￿ ￿ L￿H￿ DOO FRXQWULHV ZLWK KLJKHU SUHIHUU ed optimal prices than the optimal price of 
country X (PX
#￿ FDQQRW REWDLQ￿ YRWHV WR DSSURYH &RPPLVVLRQ￿V SURSRVDO ZLWKRXW FRXQWU\ ;￿  
•  i=XΣ
kni
v ≥ ￿￿ L￿H￿ FRXQWU\ ; DQG DOO FRXQWULHV ZLWK KLJKHU RSWLPDO SULFHV FDQ REWDLQ DW OHDVW ￿
votes to approve the proposal. 
As defined Country X is crucial for increasing the existing common price. 




 ￿ ￿￿ L￿H￿ DOO FRXQWULHV ZLWK ORZHU RSWLPDO SULFHV WKDQ WKDW RI FRXQWU\ < ￿3 Y
#) cannot 
REWDLQ￿ YRWHV WR DSSURYH &RPPLVVLRQ￿V SURSRVDO  without country Y. 
•  i=1Σ
Yni
v ≥ ￿￿ L￿H￿ FRXQWU\ < DQG DOO FRXQWULHV ZLWK ORZHU RSWLPDO SULFHV FDQ REWDLQ DW OHDVW ￿
votes to approve the proposal. 
Similarly, country Y is crucial for decreasing the existing common price. 
  It is obvious that in order to be approved, a proposed price has to be larger than PX
# and 
lower than PY
#.  In other words, these prices form the boundaries of the domain within which 
price proposals have to fall in order to have a chance to be accepted. The size of the domain 
(PX
#,PY
#) will depend on the decision-making rule, i.e. on ￿￿ 7KLV LV LOOXVWUDWHG E\ ILJXUH ￿￿ WKH
range of the domain (PX
#,PY
#) LQFUHDVHV ZKHQ WKH QHFHVVDU\ YRWHV LQFUHDVH ￿ZLWK ￿1 ! ￿2 ! ￿3 > 
￿4).   
Moreover, once approved, no other price will be preferred by the same qualified 
majority. At first sight, this suggests that the influence of the Commission would increase when a 
higher qualified majority is required for decision-making, since it appears that the influence of 
the Commission is a direct, and positive, function of the size of the (PX
#,PY
#) domain.  If the 
Commission prefers a high intervention price, it will propose a price close to PY
#. On the other 
hand, if the Commission prefers lower prices, it would propose a price close to PX
#. 
However, this is only half the story. This logic ignores the fact that the size of the 
qualified majority will also influence the likelihood of a status quo; and the latter may more than 
offset the effect of the increase in the (PX
#,PY
#) domain.  To show this, let us first derive formally   11 
the conditions on the choice of the Council of Ministers:   
 
If PEU
0 <  PX
#, PEU
N will be adopted iff  |PEU
N – PX
# | ≤  | PEU
0 – PX
# |    ( 1 0 )  
 
That is PEU
N must satisfy: PEU
N ≥  PX
# and |PEU
N – PX
# |  ≤  | PEU
0 – PX
# |.  PEU
N must be preferred 
by country X to the existing (status quo) price and must not be lower than the politically optimal 
level of country X, otherwise country X could propose a higher price. The proposal of the 
Commission will be accepted as final if PEU
N satisfies the following:  
 
PEU
N ≥  PX
# and | PEU
N – PX
# | ≤  | PEU
0 – PX





N will be adopted iff |PEU
N – PY
# | ≤  | PEU
0 – PY
# |    ( 1 2 )  
 
That is PEU
N must satisfy: PEU
N ≤  PY
# and |PEU
N – PY
# | ≤  | PEU
0 – PY
# |. PEU
N must be preferred 
by country Y to status quo and must not be bigger than politically optimal level of country Y, 
otherwise country Y could propose its decrease. The proposal of the Commission will be 
accepted as final if PEU
N satisfies the following:  
 
PEU
N ≤  PY
# and | PEU
N – PY
# | ≤  | PEU
0 – PY
# | .        ( 1 3 )  
 
These conditions imply that when PX
# < PEU
0 < PY
# no Commission proposal, PEU
N will 
be adopted by a qualified majority in the Council. In other words, if the existing common price is 
located between the intervention prices of member states X and Y, then there is no qualified 
majority in the Council that agrees on either increasing or decreasing the existing  intervention 
price, i.e. the status quo prevails.  Notice that this will always be the case when there is no 
exogenous change in the market conditions: without some exogenous change, all preferences will 
be the same as the previous year, and no new price proposal will be accepted.   
Under these conditions, only a change in external conditions can trigger a change in 
policy. However, there is an inherent bias towards the status quo under a qualified majority rule, 
DQG WKH ELDV LV VWURQJHU WKH KLJKHU LV WKH UHTXLUHG PDMRULW\ ￿ ￿￿￿ 7KLV FDQ EH VHHQ IURP ILJXUH ￿￿ 
For simplicity assume that the previous year's equilibrium intervention price was the 
same as the price preferred by the median voter country. However, since then external conditions   12 
have changed such that member state preferences have generally moved towards higher prices, 
i.e. to the right on figure 1. The result is that the existing common price, PEU
0, is lower than the 
current median voter optimal price, PEU
M. Will this exogenous change trigger a change in the EU 
common price? It depends on the voting rules. Under the simple majority rule, there would be a 
change in the EU price policy: the new equilibrium price would be PEU
M > PEU
0.  




# under this voting rule, there is no qualified majority formed that is able to change 
the price. 7KH VDPH KROGV IRU TXDOLILHG PDMRULW\￿2. However, under lower thresholds, such as 
TXDOLILHG PDMRULWLHV￿3 anG ￿4 there will be a change, as PX
# > PEU
0 under these rules.   
1RWLFH WKDW￿ ZKLOH XQGHU￿4 any price from the entire (PX
#,PY
#) range is an acceptable 
proposal for the Council of Ministers, this is not the case with a higher qualified majority, such 
DV ￿3.  Under this rule only the prices in the (PX
#,PZ
#) range will be  approved by the Council of 
Ministers, as prices to the right of PZ
# would not satisfy condition (12).   




M in figure 1. With simple majority, Commission has no influence. Its 
influence increases as the qualified majority needed to approve a proposal increases.  However, 
at the same time an increase in the qualified majority increases the likelihood of a status quo. At 
VRPH SRLQW ￿DV RI TXDOLILHG PDMRULW\ ￿4 in figure 1) the second force will begin mitigating the first 
effect, reducing the influence of the Commission. $W VRPH SRLQW ￿DV RI TXDOLILHG PDMRULW\ ￿2 in 
figure 1) it will totally offset the first effect and remove any influence of the Commission as any 
further increase in the qualified majority will lead to a status quo. 
Obviously the likelihood of a status quo, and therewith the size of the “influence 
triangle” depends on the importance of the change in external conditions. The stronger this 
change, the more likely that the status quo bias will be overcome for a given qualified majority, 
ceteris paribus.  This is illustrated by figure 2 where the “influence triangle” is drawn for two 
different assumptions on external changes.  With PEU
0(A) representing a stronger change in 
external conditions than PEU
0(B) it is clear that under condition A it is less likely that there will 
be a status quo, and more likely that the Commission can have some influence on the decision-
making.  Moreover, ceteris paribus, it can have a bigger influence as it has a larger price range 
to choose from under A compared to B. Figure 3 presents the influence of the Commission as a 
function of the voting rules, illustrating how the influence initially grows with a higher qualified 
majority, but at some point reduces again and vanishes ultimately. 
Alternatively, figures 1 and 2 can also be used to interpret the external change which is   13 
required to “trigger” a policy change.  Clearly, the larger the qualified majority, the larger 
change in external conditions that is required for a policy change to occur. Once could define the 
external change required to trigger a policy change as the “status quo bias” of the voting rules. 
Clearly, this status quo bias increases linearly with the qualified majority that is required.   
 
Unanimity Rule 
Unanimity rule can be considered as an extreme version of the qualified majority rule. 
Unanimity rule requires all Member States to agree with a new proposal; otherwise, the status 
quo will prevail. In the context of this model, this implies that the accepted price will always be 
between the lowest politically optimal intervention price of any country and the highest 
politically optimal price inside the CAP (Figure 1). When the existing price is located between 
these extreme politically optimal intervention prices, there can be no unanimous agreement on a 
change of the common price. Hence, there is extreme propensity to favor the maintenance of 
status quo under the unanimous agreement rule. The probability that the previous year common 
price is inside the P1
# - Pk
# range is high, and more likely with more diversified countries. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we consider a two stage decision-making in the European Union on the Common 
Agricultural Policy. In the first stage (national level) national governments choose their optimum 
policy level. Then we show that under various assumptions, the institutional structure of the 
CAP has an impact on the choice of the common intervention price for the EU.  
  Decision-making procedure in the EU provides some freedom to the European 
Commission to influence the final policy levels. The least powerful is the Commission under 
simple majority voting. Under simple majority the final common EU policy level is decided by 
the median voter theorem. The ideological setup, national sympathies, or farming attitudes of the 
Commission or the Commissioner responsible for agriculture are unimportant for the equilibrium 
policy.  
The Commission can influence policy level under qualified majority (including 
unanimity). Commission's potential influence increases as the qualified majority needed to 
approve a proposal increases.  
However, with the rise of qualified majority the possibility of a stalemate also increases. 
The highest probability for a status quo is when unanimous agreement is needed in the Council. 
Ceteris paribus, the higher the qualified majority voting, the higher the probability of   14 
preservation of status quo.  
The likelihood of a status quo also depends on the importance of the change in external 
conditions. The stronger this change, the more likely that the status quo bias will be overcome 
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